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Abstract 
The present paper offers empirical evidence for pareto-inefficiencies within German 
households. Using a large dataset from the German income tax statistic and 
conducting microsimulation analysis it refutes the assumption of pareto-efficiencies 
underlying the unitary as well as cooperative bargaining models of the household. 
The analysis is based on the unique features of the German source tax on wage 
income which give married couples some degree of freedom when determining their 
total tax liability and its distribution among spouses. We interpret distributive 
choices that do not minimize total tax withholding as the outcome of ineffiencient 
intra-family bargaining. Our result supports the findings of previous empirical work 
for developing countries and call for a reconsideration of the dominant models on 
intrahousehold-decision-making. 
 
Keywords: Household bargaining models, Withholding taxes, Empirics, Microsimulation 
JEL Classification: D10, D31, H24, H31 
 
Acknowledgements: Paper presented at the Conference “Income Distribution and the 
Family” in Kiel. I would like to thank Ray Rees and Christian Seidl for helpful 
comments and suggestions.  
                                                 
∗ Fraunhofer Institute for Applied Information Technology FIT, Microeconomic Modelling Group, 
Schloss Birlinghoven, 53754 Sankt Augustin, Germany, email: Sven.Stoewhase@fit.fraunhofer.de. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature on household behaviour traditionally modelled the household as one 
single economic agent, implying that there is a common household preference 
structure and family budget (Becker, 1991). In recent years, however, this unitary 
model has been criticised on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Extensive 
evidence refuting the unitary model (see e.g. Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990; 
Bourguignon et al, 1993; Browning et al, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; Browning and 
Chiappori, 1998; Tiefenthaler, 1999; Attanasio and Lechene, 2002) has been 
accumulating. These empirical results have strengthened the standing of 
intrahousehold bargaining models such as those developed by Manser and Brown 
(1980), Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The above-
mentioned models recognise the involvement of two or more agents with distinct 
preferences in determining family decision-making in a non-trivial way. However, 
similar to the unitary model, which ensures pareto-efficiency by definition, 
cooperative bargaining models still rely on the assumption of pareto-efficiency in 
household decision-making. 
 
Seemingly, at least in a non-economic context, the assumption of pareto-efficiency 
within households is not that innocent. Especially the prevalence of destructive or 
wasteful phenomena such as domestic violence cast doubt on the widely used 
assumption of intrahousehold-efficiency. In an economic context, however, empirical 
evidence against efficiency is rather scarce and furthermore limited to less developed 
countries. Using plot-level agricultural data from Burkina Faso, Udry and others 
(Udry et al, 1995; Udry 1996) find that the allocation of resources within these 
African households is pareto-inefficient.1 More recently, Dercon and Krishnan (2000), 
Duflo and Udry (2004) as well as Djebarri (2005) found similar results using data for 
Ethiopia, respectively Côte d’Ivoire and Mexico.  
 
The present paper tests for pareto-inefficient decisions within German households. To 
the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first one that finds empirical 
                                                 
1 Akresh (2007) qualifies these results to some degree by finding that pareto-inefficiencies are limited 
to a specific geographic region within Burkina Faso.  
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evidence against pareto-efficiency in the context of a developed country.2 To do so, it 
makes use of the unique features of the German source tax on wage income which 
give married couples some degree of freedom when determining their total tax 
liability and its distribution among spouses. In most cases, a household’s total tax 
liability can only be minimized for one specific distribution of tax payments between 
the two partners. This is the starting point of our analysis: If bargaining between 
household members is pareto-efficient, it should led to a minimization of total tax 
payments. A situation in which bargaining between the two partners leads to tax 
payments higher than the minimum possible is a clear indicator for pareto-
inefficiency. Using official income tax statistics for the year 1998 we test whether 
households minimize their tax payments or instead choose a different within-
household distribution of taxes at the expense of a higher total tax liability.  
 
As our calculations show, more than 20 percent of the households analysed in the 
sample do not minimize their tax payments. The exclusion of some possible reasons 
other than pareto-inefficiency does not change this result significantly, giving first  
evidence that at least for some German households intrahousehold-decision-making 
leads to pareto-inefficient outcomes. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we provide a short 
overview of the principles underlying the German withholding tax on wage income 
and derive our main proposition to test for pareto-efficiency. Section 3 describes the 
data used and the methodology to compute tax payments. Section 4 presents the 
results of the analysis. These results are discussed in Section 5 where we conduct 
some limited sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.  
  
 
2. Institutional and Theoretical Background 
 
Under the personal income tax, taxes levied on wage income of German employees 
are withheld by the employer and are directly transferred to the tax authorities on a 
monthly basis. Similar to the US and Canada taxes withheld from monthly wage 
income typically do not match the final tax liability under the personal income tax. If 
                                                 
2 Empirical studies using data from France (Bourguignon et al, 1993) and Canada (Browning et al, 
1994) have found consumption patterns generally consistent with pareto-efficiency.   
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the sum of taxes withheld exceeds the final tax liabilities under the personal income 
tax at the end of the year, the difference is refunded. In cases in which the final tax 
liability exceeds these taxes, the individual has to make an additional payment. 
Apart from the level of wage income, tax liabilities primarily depend on allowances 
and the individual tax class specified on the tax card.3 
 
Depending on their personal status, employees fall in one of six tax classes from 
which three are relevant in the case of a married couple: Tax class IV, if both spouses 
receive wage income; tax class III, if only one spouse receives wage income; and tax 
class V, if both spouses receive wage income but one has chosen to be in tax class III 
instead of tax class IV. As can be seen, married couples with two wage earners have 
some freedom in their choice of tax classes. With the combination IV/IV4 as default, 
a combination of tax class III/V or V/III is possible if both spouses agree.      
 
While tax class IV treats spouses as if they were taxed separately5 such that the 
formal income tax schedule applies to both spouses, tax classes III and V take into 
account the possibility of joint filing and income splitting.6 In the latter case, the 
basic tax allowances imbedded in the income tax schedule as well as some lump sum 
allowances of both partners are assigned to the spouse with tax class III while the 
spouse with tax class V can not make use of these allowances at all. As a result, 
individual taxes paid under tax class III are lower; those under tax class V are higher 
than with tax class IV. The choice of tax classes has a significant effect therefore on 
the distribution of taxes among the two partners. Moreover, due to the progressivity 
of the German income tax schedule, total wage taxes withheld from the family may 
vary up to several hundred Euros per month, depending on the choice of tax classes, 
total wage income of the two spouses and its distribution. Typically, tax class 
combination IV/IV minimizes source taxes paid in cases in which both spouses have 
only small wage income or when income is distributed rather equally. Tax class 
                                                 
3 The German tax card (Lohnsteuerkarte) is somehow equivalent to the W-4 form in the US.  
4 The following notation is used: tax class of the male/tax class of the female. 
5 An exception is the treatment of child allowances for the solidarity surtax. While a single individual 
can make use of all child allowances on his tax card, child allowances for married employees are split.    
6 The choice of tax classes is independent from the final choice of being taxed individually or joint. 
Hence, it is possible to choose tax class combination IV/IV while income is jointly taxed at the end of 
the year.   
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combination III/V, V/III respectively, minimizes source taxation when wage income 
is distributed unequally among partners.   
 
Even though source taxes paid on wage income are credited against the final income 
tax liability at the end of the year, the different timing of tax payments may lead to 
behavioural responses as it determines disposal income. For instance, as Shapiro and 
Slemrod (1995) have shown empirically, a change in the US withholding tax in 
February 1992, that reduced an employee’s withholding tax by about $29 per month, 
led to an increase in spending on consumption goods for about forty percent of the 
affected taxpayers. 
 
In many cases, the regulations described above lead to the condition that 
minimization of the household’s total tax liability is only possible if both spouses 
accept a certain distribution of individual wage taxes. Once a household does not 
follow the unitary approach, spouses have to negotiate about tax class choices. 
Depending on the tax class combination chosen, individual net income of the two 
spouses will differ. Lessen the tax burden of one spouse will inevitably raise the tax 
burden of the other. If households follow the life-cycle hypothesis (see e.g. Modigliani 
and Brumberg, 1954) and prefer higher actual income to a tax refund in the following 
year, pareto-optimality implies to choose tax classes such that total withholding of 
the family is minimized. Possible differences between the outcome of this tax class 
choice and the bargaining solution can then be balanced with means of side-payments 
between the two partners. Contrary, if a household does not minimize its actual tax 
payments, this is a clear indicator for an inefficient bargaining outcome.  
 
To give an example, think of a situation where minimization of taxes withheld from 
the household leads to tax payments of 20 Euros for the first person and 80 Euros for 
the second person. Family members instead prefer a solution where both spouses have 
equal tax payments. Such a distribution could be achieved with an alternative tax-
class combination where each person pays 60 Euros on taxes. If the household chooses 
the less preferred distribution and person one makes a side-payment of e.g. 30 Euros, 
both spouses would be better-off, compared to the choice of the non-minimizing tax 
class combination.   
    
This leads us to the main proposition of our analysis: 
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Conjecture: Household decisions are pareto-efficient whenever a household minimizes 
its total tax payments. Household decisions are pareto-inefficient whenever a 
household chooses a tax class combination that does not minimize current withholding.  
 
Calculating a household’s total tax liability for all three possible tax class 
combinations and comparing it with those under the tax class combination actually 
chosen by this household thus allows us to identify cases in which non-optimal 
decisions have been made. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology   
 
Our investigation on whether married couples in Germany minimize their tax 
withholding from wage income relies on official tax returns for the year 1998. The 
German Federal Statistical Office provides us with a representative 10 percent 
sample of the entire taxpayer population that accounts for approximately 3 Million 
tax returns. In addition to a number of variables essential for the calculation of the 
final income tax liability, the dataset includes information about individual wage 
incomes, wage taxes actually paid and the tax class chosen by the taxpayer on an 
annual basis. For the purpose of our analysis we constrain the given dataset in a first 
step to married couples where both spouses earn income from wages. This leaves us 
with 443.000 observations representing approximately six million taxpayer units, 
respectively twelve million wage earners.  
 
For each individual case, we compare the amount of wage taxes withheld under the 
three possible tax class combinations, IV/IV, III/V and V/III. We do so by 
simulation analysis. Using the personal information on wage income from the tax 
statistics we calculate theoretical taxes withheld for each of the combinations 
mentioned above. These calculations are not clear of difficulties: First, tax class 
changes during the year are possible. Second, due to monthly withholding and the 
progressive tax schedule, the precise amount of taxes withheld depends on the 
distribution of wage earnings during the year, such that equal annual incomes may 
lead to quite different tax liabilities within the same tax class. As this information is 
not included in our database, we make the assumption that income is distributed 
equally and that there has been no change in the tax class during the year as well. 
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Finally, our statistics provide no information about additional allowances on the tax 
card which may reduce the tax liability.7 Particularly the last problem may bias the 
results of a comparison between tax payments under different tax class combinations. 
We deal with these shortcomings by a further reduction of our sample that 
guarantees the accuracy of the simulated tax burden: Contrasting taxes calculated 
under the assumptions made above (and disregarding allowances) with taxes actually 
withheld under the chosen tax class combination, we exclude those cases from the 
analysis for which our simulation model does not yield comparable results.8 Thus, our 
database only includes those cases for which the above made assumptions hold. 
Excluding as well taxpayers for which tax liabilities do not differ with the tax class 
combination chosen, this approach leaves us with about 108.000 observations 
representing 1.6 Mio. taxpayer units.   
 
By comparing tax payments as calculated by our simulation model under the three 
possible tax class combinations we are able to state whether the tax class 
combination actually chosen minimizes taxes withheld. For those cases in which the 
actual combination does not minimize withholding, the difference between actual and 
minimal withholding can be calculated. Note that the analysis ignores the solidarity 
surcharge and church taxes since this would further complicate our calculations. 
These taxes are surcharges on the amount of taxes paid and their inclusion has no 
effect on whether a given tax class combination is tax minimizing or not. Their 
inclusion will, however, increase any difference between minimal tax payments and 
taxes actually paid up to fourteen percent (depending on whether church taxes and 
the solidarity surcharge have to be paid).   
 
 
4. Simulation Results   
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of our simulation analysis. It is shown that, for a 
total of more than 30.000 observations, tax payments under the tax class 
                                                 
7 Allowances could be calculated in principle from the data. However, such a calculation would need 
information about tax class changes and monthly income as described above.  
8 We judge a result to be “comparable” if the difference between calculated taxes and taxes actually 
withheld is smaller than three Euros per month. This is less than two percent of the average 
household’s tax liability. 
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combination actually chosen are higher than those computed for alternative tax class 
combinations. The share of these non-minimizing observations on all observations is 
larger than 28 percent. On average, these taxpayer units pay an extra of €164 on 
wage taxes each month which are only (partially) refunded after filing the tax return 
at the beginning of the following year. As becomes evident from a comparison with 
the average additional monthly tax saving of $29 reported by Shapiro and Slemrod 
(1995) for the US - which led to a significant increase in consumption -, these 
differences in tax withholding are remarkable. Even if we use the much lower median 
value of about €70, it can be argued that taxpayers may have to change their 
consumption behaviour or forego sizeable amounts of interest payments.  
 
Table 1: Minimizing and non-minimizing tax class combinations 
Tax class combination is… unweighted sample weighted sample 
tax minimizing 76.992 1.257.432 
non-minimizing 30.803 386.851 
% non-minimizing 0.286 0.235 
 
To project these figures to the entire taxpayer population, we have to use case 
specific weighting factors included in our data set. According to Table 1 almost 
387.000 or approximately 23.5 percent of all households choose a tax class 
combination that does not minimize withholding. As high-income households, for 
which potential tax savings are often larger, are overrepresented in the unweigthed 
sample, the average and the median amount of taxes that could be potentially saved 
decrease to €51, respectively €23, per month in the weighted sample. Nevertheless, 
these numbers are quite high as potential tax savings of these households amount to 
a total of approximately 240 Mio. Euro per year. In fact, this amount is given as an 
interest-free short-term credit to the government. With respect to our conjecture 
from Section 2, these results provide evidence that decisions of some German two 
wage earner households are pareto-inefficient.            
 
Using geographical information on taxpayer units included in our dataset, a 
worthwhile point for analysis is the potential heterogeneity between the eastern and 
the western part of Germany. Several studies have shown that people in the eastern 
part of Germany still behave differently from their West German counterparts. For 
the case of tax evasion, Torgler (2003) shows that tax morale in East Germany was 
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significantly higher than in West Germany in the first years after reunification. 
Moreover, using plot-level data from Burkina Faso, Akresh (2007) finds that pareto-
inefficiencies in intrahousehold allocations are limited to certain regions. In Table 2 
we therefore distinguish between households residing in the eastern and the western 
part of Germany. It becomes visible that with a fraction of about 34 percent, far 
more East than West German couples chose a non-minimizing tax class combination. 
While the fraction of non-minimizing households in West Germany is approximately 
26 percent in the unweighted sample, this number reduces to less than 19 percent in 
the weighted sample. The comparable high value for East Germany thereby primarily 
stems from the fact that most households chose tax class combination IV/IV 
irrespective whether this minimizes source taxation or not. While we can give no ad 
hoc explanation for the differences between East and West Germans with our data, it 
may be possible that West Germans are more likely to follow the male-bread-winner 
principle, while socialistic up-bringing of East Germans produced more emancipated 
woman that try to minimize their personal rather than total tax payments even if 
this is pareto-inefficient from the perspective of the entire household.     
 
Table 2: Minimizing and non-minimizing tax class combinations by region 
Tax class 
combination is… 
unweighted sample 
West Germany East Germany 
weighted sample 
West Germany East Germany 
tax minimizing 54.608 22.384 906.545 350.887 
non-minimizing 19.071 11.732 207.848 179.003 
% non-minimizing 0.259 0.344 0.187 0.338 
 
Finally, we analyse whether the fraction of non-minimizing tax class choices differs 
between income groups. Figure 1 displays the rate of non-minimizing tax class choices 
by income deciles in the weighted sample. Households are classified according to their 
total wage income. With rates ranging from a minimum of 0.183 to a maximum of 
0.269 there is indeed some heterogeneity between income groups. However, neither is 
there a systematic correlation between non-minimizing households and income, nor 
do rates for individual deciles significantly deviate from the average. It indicates that 
our results are not driven by specific groups of taxpayers but can instead applied to 
the whole taxpayer population analysed. 
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Figure 1: Non-minimizing tax class combinations by income group  
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5. Discussion and Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Our simulation analysis revealed that the tax class combination actually chosen does 
not minimize withholding in a remarkable number of cases. Following our conjecture 
from Section 2 above, this result implies that intra-household decision-making of 
some households leads to pareto-inefficient outcomes. However, there may be some 
alternative explanations why households choose a tax class combination other than 
those minimizing tax withholding.  
 
Strategic Choices 
 
One possibility stems from the regulations of the German social security and transfer 
system. As a matter of fact, maternity as well as individual benefits from mandatory 
unemployment insurance are tied to last year’s net income from wages. As net 
income is highest under tax class III and lowest under tax class V, it can be optimal 
in some cases not to choose the tax class combination that minimizes taxes withheld 
but instead to choose the tax class combination that maximizes expected future 
transfer payments. For example, in order to take full advantage of maternity benefits, 
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it would be optimal for the wife to choose tax class III as this maximizes her net 
income from wages. While our data does not allow for a formal test, the restrictions 
applied on the data set used make such a strategic choice of tax classes quite 
unlikely: As noted in Section 3, our sample does only include those households for 
which actual tax payments could be recalculated on the basis that tax classes have 
not been changed and that income is distributed equally across the year. For those 
planning to receive maternity benefits, this implies that the wife was already 
pregnant or planning to become pregnant at the beginning of the year but that no 
child was born. For those expecting to get unemployed, it implies that the 
appointment was already insecure at the beginning of the year but remained 
unchanged throughout the whole year. Otherwise, a tax class change or an evident 
change in wage income had led to the exclusion of this observation from our 
database. Therewith, the probability to observe strategic tax class choices in the 
dataset analysed can be believed to be quite low. 
 
Transaction costs 
 
A second point that can be made against pareto-inefficiency is that any change of tax 
classes incurs some, perhaps minimal, transaction costs. If, for instance, a household’s 
income changes from one year to the other, this may require an adjustment of tax 
class choices in order to sustain minimal withholding. Provided that the extra gains 
from tax minimization are rather small when compared to the transaction costs of a 
tax class change, a non-minimizing combination of tax classes may still be optimal, at 
least in the short-run. In order to test for this possibility in the weighted sample, 
Figure 2 depicts the relative frequency of households with potential tax savings above 
a certain threshold. As can bee seen from this figure, even if we introduce some kind 
of marginality rule and judge household-decisions as being efficient in cases in which 
tax savings do not exceed €10 per month, still more than 75 percent of all households 
with a non-minimizing tax class combination (or more than 17 percent of all 
households) can be classified as households with an pareto-inefficient outcome. In 
order to achieve a rate of less than 10 percent, one has to interpret all cases with tax 
savings less than €30 per month as behaving pareto-efficient. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of potential tax savings  
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Forced savings 
 
Up to this point of our analysis, we have assumed that households follow the life-
cycle hypothesis and prefer monthly payments to a year-end lump-sum. As shown by 
Romich and Weisner (2000) in the context of the Earned Income Tax Credit, this 
may not always be true. They provide evidence that some low income households in 
the US – even though they face severe budget constraints - prefer an end of the year 
lump-sum payment to monthly payments. One possible explanation for such 
behaviour comes from the behavioural life-cycle model (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). If, 
for example, households lack self-control when saving money, they may see the source 
tax on wage income as a device to force themselves to save. By choosing a tax-class 
combination that does not minimize their actual tax payments, they increase their 
tax refund after filing the tax return, which can then be used to purchase durable 
goods. Again, a direct test for or against the behavioural life-cycle model is not 
possible. However, if we follow the argumentation from above, the fraction of non-
minimizing households should crucially depend on whether the tax return results in a 
refund or not. For those households for which the final tax liability exceeds taxes 
withheld (households with additional income sources such as interest payments or 
rent income) such a forced savings mechanism does not exist. Therefore, if households 
use tax withholding as a savings device, the fraction of non-minimizing households 
should be significantly larger among those expecting a refund than among those who 
have to make a supplementary tax payment. As shown by Table 3, this is not the 
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case as the share of non-minimizing tax-class combinations is virtually the same 
between households in a tax rebate and a tax due position.             
 
Table 3: Non-minimizing tax class combinations by tax position 
   weighted cases 
minimizing 
weighted cases  
non-minimizing  
% non-minimizing 
tax rebate position 985.682 306.688 0.237 
tax due position 271.750 80.163 0.228 
 
 
      
Non-rational behaviour 
 
Excluding strategic choices, transaction costs and forced savings, the sole point that 
can be made against our interpretation that household decision making is pareto-
inefficient is completely non-rational household behaviour. A clear sign for a non-
rational behaviour may be the choice of tax class combination III/V if V/III is 
optimal and vice-versa. As becomes evident from Table 4, with about 3.000 weighted 
cases, the number of households with such an extreme tax class choice is quite low. 
Excluding these cases from our analysis has virtually no effect on the rate of non-
minimizing households and our main result that household decision-making is pareto-
inefficient for a sizeable fraction of families does still persist.   
 
Table 4: Non-minimizing tax class combinations and extreme cases* 
Non-minimizing   weighted cases % non-minimizing 
extreme cases* 3.190 0.002 
remaining cases  383.661 0.233 
 
* Tax class combination III/V if V/III is optimal and vice-versa. 
 
As our discussion has shown, the interpretation of a non-minimizing tax class choice 
as indicating that the outcome of intra-household decision-making is pareto-inefficient 
is problematic in several ways. Nevertheless, with respect to the sensitivity analysis 
conducted and bearing in mind the structure of our data sample, these problems can 
be qualified to a certain degree. We therefore interpret our results as indirect 
evidence that at least for some German two wage earner households, the bargaining 
solution is inefficient.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Virtually all models of the household, including the unitary model as well as 
cooperate bargaining models, assume pareto-efficiency in intrahousehold-decision-
making. Against this background, the present paper provides first (indirect) evidence 
for pareto-inefficiencies in intrahousehold-decision-making within a more developed 
country.  
 
To do so, it makes use of the unique features of the German source tax on wage 
income, which give married couples some degree of freedom when determining their 
tax payments and its distribution among spouses. Using a large dataset from the 
German income tax statistics, and conducting simulation analysis, our results reveal 
that more than 20 percent of the observed taxpayer population does not minimize 
their monthly tax withholding, even though this has a significant impact on disposal 
income. On average, affected households pay an extra of about €50 per month on 
taxes that could be avoided otherwise. As the distribution of tax payments among 
spouses depends on bargaining between household members where some solutions – 
which could be prevented with means of side-payments - lead to a higher total tax 
load, we interpret household decisions as being inefficient whenever we observe tax 
payments higher than the minimum possible.  
 
Using this appealingly simple approach which clearly differs from those of other 
studies, we confirm the results of previous empirical work that found inefficiencies 
within households in less developed countries. It has to be noted that this approach is 
not clear of difficulties as there might be other reasons than inefficiencies that may 
lead to tax payments higher than the minimum possible for which we can not 
completely control. Therefore, we believe that further empirical work is necessary in 
order to validate our results. Nevertheless, if taken serious, our results imply that 
even the more general approach of cooperative bargaining in household-decision-
making can be misleading in certain contexts. Future theoretical work should 
therefore reconsider the dominant models on intra-household-decision-making.  
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